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Introduction
Evolving Global Governance Structures.
Division of Labour and Co-operation between
Regional and Global Security Arrangements.
International Workshop Ebenhausen, April 68, 2000
Globalisation is leading to far-reaching structures of
mutual dependency in the international system. In
many areas, isolated national solutions are no longer
feasible. This is true for such diverse fields as inter-
national peace and security, the protection of the
environment as well as the international economy and
the protection of human rights. Without global gover-
nance neither the common problems of mankind, nor
a large number of national problems can be solved.
Endeavours to build an institutional and legal
framework to manage globalisation in its different
dimensions have begun. However, structures of global
governance are still weak. Better global governance
will not come about by itself. A sustained commit-
ment of states as well as of non-state actors is needed.
A North-South Dialogue on global governance,
jointly organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
(FEF) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP),
is meant to support this effort. The two institutions
have initiated a series of international conferences
which will involve major research institutions in the
field of international politics from countries of the
South as well as the North.
The aim of the dialogue is to scrutinise concrete
dimensions and problems of global governance. What
has to be done to create workable global governance
rules, regimes and organisations? How do existing
rules and institutions in these different fields perform
with regard to global governance? How can they be
improved?
The first conference, on April 68, 2000 in Eben-
hausen, Germany, addressed the security situation in
the major regions of the world as well as the question
how universal organisations, such as the UN, and
regional organisations can work together to improve
global governance in the field of peace and security.
This report summarises the contributions and
discussions of the conference. We very much apologise
for its delayed delivery, due to the move of SWP from
Ebenhausen  to Berlin.
Ernst Hildebrand Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES)
Winrich Kühne Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
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Executive Summary
Most of the worlds armed conflicts are intrastate
conflicts. These were not seen as a major immediate
threat to national security by most participants, with
the notable exceptions of the Middle East and South-
west Asian regions. Most challenges to security in
times of globalisation derive from sources different
than traditional military threats.
In Central and Latin America, war is not a major
concern at present. There is only one border-conflict
simmering between Colombia and Venezuela. The
most threatening developments are the rise of
resource conflicts, new guerrilla movements and the
explosion of large-scale organised criminal violence.
Increasing state weakness is alarming and is reflected
in the growing inefficiency of judicial systems, in the
privatisation of police and security sectors, in the
increase in small arms transfer, drug trafficking and
in the rising number of paramilitary groups. Negative,
uncontrolled effects of globalisation were discussed in
more detail. Continuing population growth will
exacerbate these effects.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the only recent interstate
war, between Eritrea and Ethiopia, has been stopped.
The main concern is violent intrastate conflict and
state fragmentation, in particular in East and Central
Africa and also, increasingly, in West Africa. Human
suffering is extreme as is the disruption of economic
and social life. Massive streams of refugees have
become an additional source of conflict, creating a
vicious circle of decay. One positive aspect was noted
in that weapons of mass destruction do not play a role
in Sub-Saharan Africa, just as in Latin America.
The reasons why African states are particularly
prone to internal violent conflicts were discussed at
some length. The present state of political systems in
Sub-Saharan Africa is marked by a fluctuation between
a partly successful implementation of democratic ele-
ments, a marked persistence of authoritarianism and
states breaking down into violent conflict. Partici-
pants agreed that Sub-Saharan Africa witnessing an
exceptional phase of its history.
In the Middle East, security is still predominantly
perceived to be related to traditional interstate con-
flicts over territorial claims. Perception of security as a
zero-sum game is still prevalent in the region. This
perception is mainly due to the long history of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. There are other conflicts
smouldering in the region, such as interstate disputes
over territories between Morocco and Algeria, Libya
and Chad, Egypt and Sudan, Syria and Turkey, as well
as ongoing intrastate conflicts in Algeria, Afghanistan,
southern Sudan and Turkey. The continuing insecuri-
ty in these regions is inter alia reflected in a high con-
centration of military forces. In addition, the prolifer-
ation of weapons of mass destruction is of profound
concern.
On the rise are terrorism, conflict over water, drug
trafficking and other new types of threats. However,
opinions differed with regard to the danger of conflict
over water. Shortage of water is surely the most
pressing environmental problem in the Middle East.
But whether it will exacerbate existing tensions, or
even create violent conflict, was controversial. Globali-
sation was assessed as a double-edged sword for the
region. While globalisation generates more co-oper-
ation and thereby eases tensions, at the same time, it
will strengthen rather than weaken the divergent
socio-religious group identities.
Regarding Asia, the ongoing arms race which
involves the buildup of nuclear capacities in two of
the regions hot spots, was judged to be alarming by
most of the participants. But there were some strong
voices of dissent, in particular from the Indian side.
Also participants from Korea pointed out that the
regional arms buildup not only produces destabi-
lising, but also stabilising effects  a situation similar
to the relative stability brought about in Europe by the
mutual deterrence in the past Cold War era.
Most of the internal conflicts in the region are
caused by ethnic, religious or linguistic differences
within states, similar to those in Africa. In the course
of state and nation-building processes, the majority of
governments strongly promoted centralisation and
imposed a national identity on ethnic groups. This
inevitably led to tensions or even open conflict linked
to the ethnic, religious and linguistic identity of dif-
ferent groups.
Nevertheless, the overall regional security situation
was characterised as a stable instability on the inter-
state level. Asia is a highly dynamic region, in particu-
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lar with regard to the rapid economic development it
has experienced even after its financial crisis. This
development greatly exposes the region, especially
Southeast Asia, to the effects of globalisation. Yet,
despite globalisation, sovereignty and national
prestige continue to determine the regional agenda.
In Europe, security is divided into different zones.
Within the EU, stability prevails; major inter- as well
as intrastate conflict is hardly imaginable. Develop-
ments within East and Southeast Europe and the
Caucasus region, as well as within the Russian Feder-
ation show a different picture. The greatest menace to
Europes overall security is the scenario of an im-
ploding and further fragmenting Russia. There is no
lasting political solution of the Kosovo conflict in
sight. The peace process in Bosnia remains fragile.
The discussion then briefly addressed various
measures, such as disarmament treaties, verification
agreements and CBMs (confidence building measures),
to stabilise the eastern region as a whole. Regarding
this aspect, Europe is worried about the U.S. plans to
create a National Missile Defence, which could
possibly unsettle present arms control and disarma-
ment regimes. Integrating the new states into western
structures, in particular, NATO, the EU and the
Council of Europe is another important means of
stabilisation. Membership, as well as the incentive of
promised membership in EU and NATO, has helped
and will help to prevent conflict. The problem with
this strategy is that it does not reach some of those
states which are most prone to conflicts, such as
Albania, Georgia, etc.
Debate on Humanitarian Intervention
The war in Kosovo triggered a lively debate on the
issues of sovereignty and the right of the international
community to intervene in another states internal
affairs. Some held that humanitarian intervention is
an inevitable consequence of the rising importance of
human rights. Others pointed out the high degree of
selectiveness which inevitably accompanies it. The
inherent danger of double standards is a very
troubling perspective, particularly for the less power-
ful countries of the South. Some felt that the creation
of formalised standards for intervention could
minimise this danger. A new definition of inter-
national security is needed.
A contentious question posed was which inter-
national bodies should be entrusted to authorise such
interventions. The role that regional organisations can
play differs from region to region. Europe has an
abundance of regional organisations. Their division of
labour is still unclear and needs to be better defined.
Asian states, however, anxiously guard their sover-
eignty and seem unwilling to give regional organi-
sations the power to interfere in their internal affairs.
This contrasts with Europe, Africa and the Americas,
where most states are less reluctant to transfer limited
parts of their sovereignty. In the final analysis, the UN
was regarded by most participants as the proper and
primary forum to provide legality for intervention,
although the Security Council (SC) neither works well
nor has a sufficiently representative composition.
Globalisation, the State and Civil Society
The discussion then dwelled on the question whether
the existence of a strong state, or its nonexistence, is
an important variable for regional and international
stability. What constitutes a strong state in view of the
dynamics of globalisation? Opinions differed. Reliable
criteria to assess the strength of a state are difficult to
specify. Globalisation is exacerbating this uncertainty.
Today, there is a much stronger demand on the ability
of states to respond swiftly and adequately to
changing domestic and international developments.
Institutional efficiency seems to become more decisive
for internal stability and global competitiveness than
potent military and police forces. The dichotomy
between strong and weak is misleading and
should be replaced by effective state.
The role of civil society was also judged to be
ambiguous. Some felt that the effectiveness of a state
was highly overestimated and suggested that carefully
crafted state structures which reach to the very
bottom of society could accomplish the same tasks
better. Others disagreed. Civil society embraces some
characteristics which state structures cannot accom-
plish. Its task is not only to transmit the needs of the
population to state structures but also to pressure the
latter to accommodate these needs. This, however,
enhances the danger of critically undermining state
structures, as can be seen in some parts of Africa. It
was the prevailing view that civil society should there-
fore play only a complementary role to the state and
not be its substitute.
Crisis of Public Order
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The Security Situation in Central and Latin America
Low Expectation of Interstate Conflicts
At present, war is not a major concern in Latin
America. There is one border-conflict simmering
between Colombia and Venezuela. The other border
conflicts have been resolved. One important reason
given in the discussion for this positive development
is the democratisation of Latin American countries.
Another reason is the increasing co-operation in the
economic and energy sectors on a bilateral as well as
multilateral level, for example the integration of Latin
American economies in MERCOSUR. Weapons of mass
destruction as a relevant military and political factor
in regional relations are absent.
Crisis of Public Order
The most threatening developments are the rise of
resource conflicts, new guerrilla movements and the
explosion of criminal violence. Two slightly different
lines of discussion emerged that varied in the weight
they put on the main reasons responsible for these
developments. One line of discussion emphasised that
these new conflicts are mainly a consequence of state
weakness. Indicators such as the growing inefficiency
of judicial systems, privatisation of police and security
sectors, an increase in small arms transfer, drug
trafficking and a rise in the number of paramilitary
groups all call attention to these major problems of
the nation-states weakness and the crisis of public
order along with it. There are several reasons for this
development which were only touched upon briefly in
the discussion. Negative, uncontrolled effects of
globalisation obviously play a role. Various kinds of
illicit ways of doing business are spreading, such as
! illegal migration traffic,
! small weapons trade,
! trans-national nuclear/toxic waste traffic,
! smuggling of endangered species,
! money laundering and
! cultivation and trafficking of narcotics.
The rise of these illegal activities undermines the
stability of states in the region in several ways:
! Production and trafficking of drugs cause environ-
mental damage, such as deforestation and
pollution.
! New businesses rely on violence. Turf wars between
competing gangs as well as attacks on executive
state representatives lead to increased social
violence and the breakdown of public order.
! Governments are confronted with strong internal,
illicit actors who compete with the state in carrying
out some of its original functions. The drug war is
increasingly being fought by military means, often
with the support of U.S. military aid, which Latin
American countries receive, thus shifting the inter-
nal power balance towards the military. A gradual
militarisation of society is the consequence.
! It was pointed out that the relations between the
Latin American countries and the U.S. have become
increasingly difficult as the U.S. insist on the
supply-countries responsibility to prevent the culti-
vation of narcotics. Fears are increasing that the
U.S., traditionally having a stake in the region, may
directly intervene in Latin American countries to
curb the drug traffic.
Basically, this first argument holds the weakness of
Latin American states to be responsible for the current
crisis of public order as it leaves space for illicit busi-
nesses to grow. The attempt of the protagonists of
these businesses to take over some of the states core
functions intensifies the decline of its power.
The other line of argument equates globalisation
with modern capitalism. It is supposed to structurally
harm the countries at the economic periphery. The
present international economic system features
several characteristics with a strong impact on social
developments1:
! The power-relation between labour and capital
means the dominance of the latter. The loss of
1  Pran Chopra, a participant from India adds: These are not
defects of globalisation per se, which by itself is unavoidable
and not bad, but of the kind of globalisation which is taking
place. It has created a global cartel of the affluent of many
countries, developed as well as developing. India is an
example for the latter. They already had control of the
economies of their countries. Now they control the global
economy, to the detriment of the global majority, both in
terms of countries and their populations.
The Security Situation in Central and Latin America
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labour-intensive production modes and inter-
national production chains that are easy to move
lead to structural unemployment. High unemploy-
ment leads to the exclusion of citizens from
markets (and influence).
! The free and rapid mobility of capital poses a threat
to weak economies depending on this capital. In a
moment of crisis it becomes highly volatile. The
declining importance of measures taken by nation-
al governments to hinder this development is
alarming.
! The stability of currency and the tightening of
public budgets in order to maintain monetary
stability reduce the scope of governments to act on
social policy. This is especially dangerous at times
when social exclusion is on the increase.
The discussion led to a somewhat grim post-modern
outlook.2 Whether states are weak or not has become
less important because the effectiveness of national
governments is being reduced by the economys inter-
nationalisation. Markets have already integrated inter-
nationally, and to regain influence, politics have to do
the same. At present, the prevalence of the logic of
markets over politics exposes a large number of indi-
viduals and society as a whole to challenges which
neither is yet able to deal with. This results in
exploding violence, especially in cities where develop-
ments are experienced more intensely. Rising popu-
lation growth will exacerbate this tendency.
How to Deal with the Crisis of Public Order
in Latin America
Although the two lines of argument put different
weight on the reasons that are responsible for the
deterioration of public order in a number of states,
they both perceive international co-operation as a
solution to their respective problems. The first school
2  Tullo Vigevani, a participant from Brazil, adds: I believe
that the two lines of explanation are not antagonistic. On the
one hand, the theory of the weakness of the Latin American
State, shows  in opposition to some neo-liberal thesis  that
the problems of this region are linked with the weakness of
the instruments of the state. This becomes more and more
evident because all big issues in these countries are linked
with subjects of internal public order. International conflicts
are not important. On the other hand, it is true at the same
time that the problems of Latin American states result also
from the kind of globalisation that is taking place. We need a
strong state to break the logic of hegemony and the market of
this kind of globalisation.
seeks to re-establish public order by strengthening
state structures. Because Latin American states are
probably unable to cope with this challenge by them-
selves, they will have to rely on the assistance of inter-
national organisations and foreign governments. This
support can assume two forms, one being direct
foreign assistance to strengthen the state in question
and the other would be to weaken the illicit actors by
establishing international regimes based on norms
that reduce these actors room for manoeuvring.
According to the second argument, there is no point
in strengthening individual state structures. Ways
have to be found to extend the legitimisation of
political action to entities larger than nation-states,
for example the European Union. Another option
would be to regain control of markets by strengthen-
ing and democratising international monetary insti-
tutions. Their task would be to control the free forces
of capitalism and defend economically weak countries
from their worst hardships.
Creation of International Institutions /
Global Governance Structures
The discussion then focused on the need to strengthen
international regimes and institutions as global gover-
nance structures. International regimes must be based
on:
! principles of shared responsibility,
! equal representation and democratic decision-
making to reflect contemporary hegemonic values
and
! better representation of NGOs.
At present, there are many regimes concerned with
environmental and social issues, but there is no inter-
national standard on rights and treatment of illegal/
economic migrants. Furthermore, existing regimes are
often not well designed and do not fulfill their tasks.
To establish a functioning regime, parties first have to
codify common norms and then comply with these
norms.
Codifying norms is done best when driven by epi-
stemic communities and NGOs. In the case of great
normative contradictions, the combination of several
issues can extend the room for bargaining. Com-
promises should reflect a reasonable balance. In the
drug issue, for example the U.S. pushed through
norms which only related to the supply side of the
problem, leaving the demand side unaddressed.
Several participants strongly demanded that the U.S.
Creation of International Institutions / Global Governance Structures
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should take much greater responsibility for getting its
internal demand for drugs under control.
Effective monitoring and enforcement continue to
be a fundamental problem for international regimes.
Most regimes today leave the implementation of
norms up to national governments, which often fail to
take the necessary steps. Therefore, a wide gap exists
between the creation of norms and their implemen-
tation. In Latin America, examples for all of the above-
mentioned regime deficiencies can be found. In the
case of illegal migrants, even the codification of norms
seems impossible.
The Security Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa
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The Security Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa
Interstate War
At present, the only current interstate war being
fought is between Eritrea and Ethiopia. There are
several other latent interstate conflicts, but few have
been active in the last couple of years. Most of them
rise up around artificial borders dating back to the
European colonisation of Africa.
Environmental and Resource Conflicts
Major environmental problems are evolving:
increasing pollution (air quality), population growth,
decreasing access to land and to water, endangered
species etc. Desertification, water shortage or pol-
lution might lead to future conflict. The climate
change does have effects on the region, however, it
will not necessarily lead to conflicts. Compliance to
regimes, generally speaking, is not sufficient through-
out the region. Tensions arise from the opposing inter-
ests of South Africa, on the one hand, which wants to
impose standards in environmental issues, and on the
other, those of less developed countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa claiming their right to industriali-
sation and thus pollution.
Intrastate Conflict
Artificial colonial borders are also a reason for the rise
of intrastate conflicts in East and Central Africa, the
Sudan and other areas. These conflicts are of great
concern because they cause serious instability within
entire regions. The disruption of economic life as a
consequence of internal conflicts leads to an intensifi-
cation of material crises and social decay. This again
results in the escalation and perpetuation of conflict,
thus creating a vicious circle. Large streams of refu-
gees have become an additional source of conflict. As
seen, in particular, in the Great Lakes region and the
DR of Congo, the intense interaction between intra-
and interstate conflicts has become an enormous
obstacle for conflict prevention and conflict solution.
The proliferation of small weapons has significantly
increased after the end of the East-West conflict, with
the Eastern European states being major suppliers.
Even though these weapons do not cause conflicts,
their availability significantly raises the level of
violence in the region. To end on a positive note it was
pointed out that weapons of mass destruction do not
play a role in Sub-Saharan Africa, just as in Latin
America.
The reasons why African states are particularly
prone to internal violent conflicts were discussed at
some length. There is a cumulation of profound
processes of transformation.
In Africa, modernisation and development com-
bine with tradition in a unique way. Africas social,
economic and cultural logic often mix in ways not
easily perceptible to Western standards. This combi-
nation creates tensions and leads to disorder, which is
the prevailing characteristic of several African soci-
eties. These difficulties cannot be solved by a simple
recourse to Western concepts of modern society.
Adequate African solutions have yet to be found.
Civil society in Sub-Saharan Africa is still weak. The
African state inherited and has not yet overcome some
aspects of the colonial state which prevent the emer-
gence of civil society. The state-society relation, in
general, is a clientelistic one. The state maintains
many ties with different groups, but there is no scope
for society as a whole to develop, for the different
groups to bargain or ally with each other on certain
questions. The economic structure of African states
does not encourage private activity. A large part of
African economies is dominated by rentier activities.
During the independence struggle, civil society
developed as a comprehensive social movement
against the colonial state, but after independence was
reached, it was again suppressed by the newly
emerged governments which continued to pursue
clientelistic relations to society. The lack of bargaining
space for social groups has reinforced the social sepa-
ration of African societies along ethnic, local or lan-
guage lines. Coherence of diverse interests of the
different social groups could not develop. The same
holds largely true for national identity and constitutes
a formidable obstacle to the consolidation of democ-
racy.
Solutions to Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa  No Quick Fix
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Lately, the decline of state power has opened up
some room for the growth of civil society, but it is not
yet great enough to bring about sustained change.
Other forces, like warlords, militias etc. seem to play a
more dynamic role.
In sum, the past decade has brought about some
changes in African political culture. Both an increase
in political liberalisation, shifts to competitive elec-
tions, and albeit, a gradual development of civil
society, of social and economic associations can be
observed. This does not actually mean the dawn of
democracy. But it shows that Africa is not a hopeless
case, that there is an oscillation between democratic
developments and authoritarian tendencies and that a
progressive implementation of democratic values as
cultural values must be continued.
Solutions to Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
No Quick Fix
In sum, the present state of political systems in Sub-
Saharan Africa is marked by a fluctuation between
partly successful implementation of democratic ele-
ments, strong persistence of authoritarianism and
states breaking down into violent conflict.
African people are hardly prepared to meet these
challenges on their own and need assistance to resolve
them. The question was discussed as to how this
assistance should be defined. New forms have to be
developed and implemented. The goal should be to
replace war-making coalitions and to provide civil
society actors with more room to perform con-
structive, non-violent participation.
However, as several participants pointed out, giving
space to civil society is not a substitute for solid state-
building on the basis of good governance and the rule
of law. In this framework different kinds of non-state
actors, churches, NGOs, businesses etc. will have to
play a more prominent role. A better understanding of
conflict prevention, in general, and of the comparative
advantages of actors, of their reasons for and manner
of interference needs to be developed. There are no
quick fixes to Africas problems. Sub-Saharan Africa is
in an exceptional phase of its history.
The Security Situation in the Middle East
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The Security Situation in the Middle East
The On-going Arab-Israeli Conflict
The security situation in the Middle East is split. On
the one hand, there is a peace process going on
between Israel and its Arab neighbouring states,
which is painfully slow and ambivalent. The goal of
peace has become a very recent development in the
Middle East and, despite peace-talks, it is far from
being settled. There is still a high risk of war. On the
other hand, changes in the parties underlying per-
ceptions of security are taking place and are
improving the long term outlook for peace.
Most importantly, a settlement has been increasing-
ly perceived as a win-win situation by the Israeli
public. This was the view of some participants; others
judged it as too optimistic. Hence, settlement pro-
posals are being discussed in more rational terms, and
achieve a balance between territorial, military and
regional stability. This has resulted in progress,
particularly on the bilateral level between Israel and
some of the neighbouring Arab countries.
But this progress on a bilateral level is not enough
to resolve the conflict, because there is also a truly
regional dimension. The conflict is not only between
Israel and some of its neighbours, it is also a conflict
between Israel and the entire region.
Although bilateral peace accords are helpful in
stabilising the Middle East. Yet, Israel still has to inte-
grate itself into the region in an organic manner. Two
obstacles are salient and were elaborated upon in the
discussion.
First, Israel has to adopt an identity that will allow
for its regional integration. This requires a domestic
consensus on Israels identity. At present, Israels
society is deeply torn by inner conflict. Diverse groups
have very different ideas as to what constitutes Israels
identity. Some consider it a U.S. bridgehead and
Western state, others want it to be the state of the Jews
or a Middle East power. In the view of several partici-
pants, sorting these different ideas out domestically
and integrating them into a common understanding
of an identity which makes Israel acceptable as a truly
Middle East actor, is a prerequisite for a compre-
hensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Second, if Israel adopts an identity as a Middle East
actor, the actual terms of its integration into the
region will still have to be negotiated. At present,
Israel is the supreme regional power in military as
well as in economic terms. In the long run, as some
participants argued, integration would require its
willingness to give up this predominant role and to
share military and political power with its Arab neigh-
bours.
Further Sources of Conflict
The discussion then turned to other tensions
smouldering in the Middle East. They include inter-
state disputes in territories between Morocco and
Algeria, Libya and Chad, Egypt and Sudan, Syria and
Turkey, as well as ongoing intrastate conflicts in
Algeria, Afghanistan, southern Sudan, and Turkey.
The continuing insecurity in the region is inter alia,
reflected by the high level of armament. Following the
Gulf War in 1991, a significant arms build-up took
place and, although it has decreased within the last
few years, a high percentage of the states GDP still
goes into military spending. As a result, the Middle
East, today, is one of the regions with the worlds most
sophisticated arms technology.
During the discussion, some of the participants
accused Israel of triggering a new round in the arms
race by pursuing an offensive missiles program. This
program, in combination with the availability of other
weapons of mass destruction, poses a major threat to
regional stability. All the participants agreed that the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of
special concern to the region. The fact that Israels
nuclear program is not integrated into appropriate
international regulations, adds to this concern. The
unclear situation with regard to Iraq was also ad-
dressed as being very troublesome.
In sum, the situation in the Middle East is still
distressing in terms of peace and stability. Perception
of security as a zero-sum game is still prevalent.
Regional dynamics are driven, to a large extent, by the
pursuit of short-term national self-interest. Assuring
national prestige via a strong military is still a widely
spread practice. But, as indicated above, there are
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some new developments taking place, which could
possibly change perceptions within the region and
lead to more peaceful co-operation in the long run.
Promising Beginnings of Co-operation
Terrorism, conflict over water, drug trafficking and
other new types of threats to security are growing in
the Middle East. While terrorism was clearly perceived
as a major security risk by the participants, opinions
differed with regard to water shortage. It surely is the
most pressing environmental problem in the Middle
East, but whether it will exacerbate existing tensions
or even explode into violent conflict, was contro-
versial. As these threats obviously cannot be success-
fully dealt with by single states, they may contribute
to overcoming the narrow, nationalistic under-
standing of security, instead. Perception of security as
a zero-sum game may change to a win-win under-
standing. Such a change of perception would reinforce
the above-mentioned co-operative efforts already
taking place in the region.
New players are becoming involved in the region.
NATO and the EU are pursuing programs to bring
together states of the region and to establish co-
operative structures between them. NGOs are setting
up processes of track two diplomacy, and Norway
has played a crucial role in mediating the Arab-Israeli
conflict. On the environmental front, some countries
in the Mediterranean and, since 1999, in the Gulf
region as well, are joining efforts against pollution.
In the military field, the Gulf War in 1991 was a
watershed when more than 40 nations joined forces to
solve a local conflict. Since then, joint military
exercises between some Arab and European countries
and the U.S. have increased. Furthermore, partici-
pation of Arab units in peace-keeping operations has
fostered co-operation between them and other troops
and paved the way for a new understanding of the role
of the military.
The Role of Globalisation
Finally, the discussion dealt with the double impact of
globalisation on the region. With regard to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, it seems to complicate even more the
already mentioned need of consensus on Israels
identity. And, as in other regions, globalisation is
expected to strengthen rather than weaken the
divergent socio-religious group identities. Some
participants even feared that if this happens and Israel
does not become integrated into the region during the
next few years, it will further increase its dominant
role in the region, thereby augmenting tensions. This
option may be attractive for some in Israel, assuming
that due to its modern economy, it is in a much better
position than most of its neighbouring Arab countries
to take advantage of the benefits of globalisation, such
as Europe, the U.S., Japan and some Asian countries
are.
The Security Situation in Asia
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The Security Situation in Asia
Asia is a highly dynamic region, in particular with
regard to the rapid economic development it enjoys
even after its financial crisis. This dynamic strongly
exposes the region, especially Southeast Asia, to the
effects of globalisation. Important changes are also
going on in the political sphere. Chinas unstoppable
rise as a major global actor is just one of these
changes.
Yet, despite globalisation, sovereignty and national
prestige continue to determine the regional agenda. A
change of mind is coming about only gradually. The
move to more regional co-operation, therefore, is only
a recent development. Co-operation in the field of
security is particularly difficult. The lack of workable
multilateral security structures has to be considered
as a concern for the entire international community.
The ongoing arms race which involves the build-up of
nuclear capacities in two of the regions interstate con-
flict hot spots was judged to be alarming by most of
the participants. But there were some strong voices of
dissent, particularly from the Indian side.
Interstate Conflict
According to one of the panellists, the conflict
between India and Pakistan and the military clashes
emerging there are misconceived and overly drama-
tised in Western public opinion. Rather than being
large-scale wars, occasional and limited confronta-
tions serve to satisfy nationalist feelings within both
societies, despite strong escalatory rhetoric on both
sides. The situation is under control because neither of
the two states can wage an all-out war for a number of
reasons. Personal ties among generals, many of them
trained in the same foreign military academies, com-
mon religious and ethnic grounds and other inter-
dependencies play a role as limiting factors. Nuclear
weapons contribute further to stabilising the conflict
by adding mutual deterrence as an additional con-
straint.
Several participants, although impressed by the
vigour of arguments put forward by the panellist,
strongly disagreed with this assessment. In their view,
there is considerable potential for escalating the
conflict between India and Pakistan. In the view of
these participants the nuclear tests conducted by India
and Pakistan have increased the danger of escalation.
The rather positive interpretation of nuclear weapons
having a stabilising effect was criticised by other par-
ticipants as being based too much on the assumption
of rational behaviour under conditions of crisis. This,
by no means, can be presupposed.
With regard to the conflict between South and
North Korea, participants agreed that the danger of
escalation is low at the moment. South Korea fears the
collapse of North Korea, rather than a major attack.
The latters decision to go nuclear was considered by
several participants as being of limited impact on the
overall security situation because South Korea had
already been vulnerable in military terms before.
There are more potential trouble spots in Asia
which were touched on only briefly in the discussion.
Nevertheless, the regions security situation was
characterised as a stable instability on the interstate
level.
Intrastate Conflict
Most of the internal conflicts in the region are caused
by ethnic, religious or linguistic differences within
states, similar to those in Africa. There is also a legacy
of colonial borders, drawn without regard to local
ethnic composition, but maintained after indepen-
dence. In the course of state and nation building
processes, most governments strongly promoted
centralisation and imposed a national identity on
ethnic groups. This inevitably led to tensions or even
open conflict with regard to their ethnic, religious
and linguistic identity.
Globalisation will aggravate these tensions. It
entails a decrease authority by the nation state, while
simultaneously strengthening smaller entities, like in
particular ethnic and religious groups. They will have
more leverage to search for greater autonomy or even
independence.
States in Asia pursue diverse minority policies
which have different impacts on their internal
stability. Indonesia follows a policy of assimilation,
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which tends to increase tensions, as witnessed in East
Timor as well as in Aceh and other regions. Malaysia,
in contrast, pursues a policy of support and integra-
tion, strengthening minorities, on the one hand, and
assuring internal stability on the other. India also sets
the example that the process of nation-building, in
spite of great political and linguistic diversity, needs
not be suppressive and centralist. It can allow for
differences and the regionalisation of power, thereby
reducing tensions.
These few examples demonstrate two important
facts: First, states in Asia have a choice in pursuing
different kinds of minority policies; second, whatever
choice made will have a strong impact on internal
stability and create the danger of violent conflict.
The discussion then dwelled on the question as to
whether the existence of a strong state or a weak
state is an important variable to stability. Yet, there
was little agreement as to what constitutes a strong
state. Reliable criteria to assess the strength of a state
are difficult to specify. They may also change
according to the concrete historical context. Asian
states were strong in the Cold War context, with their
strength based on large militaries, powerful police
forces and effective secret services. The lack of a solid
and popular institutional base was of limited impor-
tance.
With the end of the Cold War, this lack of a
comprehensive institutional strength became appa-
rent. The influence of globalisation has made this
weakness even more apparent. There is a much
greater demand on the ability of states to respond
swiftly and adequately to changing domestic and
international developments. Institutional strength
has, therefore, become much more decisive for in-
ternal stability than mighty military and police forces.
With the strength of a state depending to a large
degree on its domestic institutional structures, the
term strong state is, therefore, misleading and
should be replaced by effective state. Participants
felt that much more time would be needed to ascer-
tain more in detail, which factors constitute an
effective state in the area of globalisation, at the same
time taking into account the specific conditions of
Asia (or any other region in the world).3
3  Pran Chopra from India adds: Many of the countries
which became independent with the retreat of colonialism
are plural societies and polities. They also account for the
majority of the worlds population. Therefore, pure majori-
taranism among them, be it formally democratic or other-
wise, could be as unjust as the external colonialism which
The need to look at the specifics of a regime also
applies to the question of the role of civil society.
Some participants felt that the role of civil society in
supporting the effectiveness of a state was highly over-
estimated and suggested that carefully crafted state
structures reaching to the very bottom of society could
better accomplish the same tasks, for example Singa-
pore. Others disagreed. Civil society possesses some
characteristics which state structures cannot realise;
its task is not only to transmit the needs of the popu-
lation to state structures but also to pressure the latter
to accommodate these needs. In case the state is not
receptive, civil society and its organisations have the
option to act on their own and to sideline state
structures. This, however, entails the danger of
critically undermining state structures, as can be seen
in some parts of Africa. Some participants felt very
strongly about this danger. To be sound, civil society
should therefore play only a complementary role to
the state and not be a substitute for some of its
functions.
Environmental Risks
New conflicts in Asia may also arise from environ-
mental degradation. There are plenty of environ-
mental problems in the region, many of which have
border-crossing impact, such as acid wind and rain,
scarcity of public resources (water) and nuclear
dumping. These problems clearly have the potential to
create serious interstate fractions.
The present level of environmental co-operation in
the region to contain these dangers is quite low,
although some positive examples can be found. The
low level of co-operation is inter alia due to the above
mentioned importance attached to sovereignty and
non-interference. Public awareness of environmental
risks is also still meager, as in many other developing
countries. Moreover, most Asian states are currently
preoccupied with redressing the consequences of the
past financial crisis, emphasising economic instead of
environmental development.
The prospects for more co-operation in the field of
they overthrew. At the same time, the majority also has its
legitimate claims in a democracy. The answer to this dilem-
ma lies in democracy combined with decentralisation and
devolution of power. This combination cannot be imposed
from without, and must never be tempted. It must grow from
within. But better education, from within and from without,
about successes and failures can help.
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environment were judged to be modest. China, for
instance, persistently regards the national level as best
suited to resolve environmental problems. Co-
operation is seen as a last resort and is, therefore,
exceptional. A further obstacle to region-wide co-oper-
ation arises from the fact that Japan, both scientifi-
cally and financially, is taking a strong lead in seeking
solutions for regional environmental problems. This is
not only perceived by other states as an end in itself
but also as a way of Japan expanding its dominating
role in the region.
Despite these obstacles, most participants expected
environmental co-operation to develop slowly but
surely in the region. For the near future, it will be
restricted to agreeing on (or extending) bilateral co-
operation schemes between states on specific issues.
When it comes to multilateral, international agree-
ments, most states will resent binding international
norms and continue to prefer voluntary agreements,
on a case-by-case basis.
The outlook is much better in the economic sector.
Co-operation has improved and is gaining steadily in
importance. Although suspicion towards any regime
that undermines national sovereignty will continue to
be a limiting factor, the existing structures may partly
be taken advantage of to promote and facilitate
environmental co-operation. The prospects for future
economic co-operation also seem to be slightly better
due to the need to focus on economic improvement.
Some participants even expected that in the long run,
widening economic and environmental co-operation
will help to stabilise the region and contain conflicts.
Debate on Humanitarian Intervention
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The Security Situation in Europe
Security in Europe
Security in Europe is divided into several zones. With-
in the EU, stability prevails, major inter- as well as
intrastate conflict is hardly imaginable due to
advanced economic and political integration. Develop-
ments in East and Southeast Europe and the Caucasus
region, as well as within the Russian Federation reveal
a different picture. The profound processes of trans-
formation going on in these states sustain the danger
of rising tension, possibly leading to mostly internal
conflicts. In particular, the scenario of an imploding
and further fragmentation of Russia represents a
growing menace to Europes overall security. It is not
yet clear what impact the war in Chechnya will have
on Russias stability, but it has already demonstrated
how little impact EU policy has on Russia. The conflict
continues to irritate the dialogue between the two
sides.
Attempts to improve the security situation outside
the EU basically take two directions:
Firstly, to stabilise the Eastern region as a whole,
including Russia, various measures, such as disarma-
ment treaties, verification agreements and CBMs are
being pursued. Consequently, Europe is worried about
the U.S. plans to create a National Missile Defence,
which contain risks to unsettle present arms control
and disarmament regimes.
Secondly, there are efforts to stabilise the inte-
gration of the new states into Western structures, in
particular, NATO, the EU and the Council of Europe.
By including new members into its structures and
offering close co-operation with other states, the EU is
providing valuable assistance to the transition
process, as well as creating an atmosphere of stability
and an outlook for prosperity. Membership, as well as
the incentive of promised membership to the EU and
the UN, helps to prevent conflict. The problem with
this strategy is that it hardly reaches any of those
states which are most prone to conflicts, such as
Albania, Georgia, etc.
NATOs war against Serbia is still controversial with
regard to its legality, its methods and its effectiveness.
It has also shown Europes dramatic dependence on
U.S. military capabilities, structures and technology.
Due to the Kosovo war, European states have realised
that they will have to take their defence and security
co-operation into their own hands, to a much greater
extent, as well as strengthen their capabilities. Efforts
to create a true European Security and Defence
Identity (ESDI) have been enhanced. Still, for the time
being, ESDI is, for the most part, on paper.
Politically, there is no solution in sight for the
Kosovo conflict. Concerning the ethnic composition of
its population, the Western European vision of setting
an example of non-ethnic statehood in the region
clearly does not match the desire of the Kosovo
Albanians for complete secession from Yugoslavia.
Autonomy, as prescribed in the mandate for the inter-
national peace operations in the Kosovo, led by KFOR
and UNMIK, is not what the Kosovo Albanians want.
Full independence, however, is deeply resented by
most European states as it might set a problematic
precedent for other minorities in Southeastern
Europe. More violence in Southeastern Europe and
other parts of Europe would be the result.
Therefore, Kosovo will be a difficult test for success-
ful peace-building by the UN and KFOR. The Kosovo, as
well as Bosnia and Herzegovina will tie down Europe
and the U.S. in the Balkan for some time to come. The
inevitable consequence will be that this immense
involvement will keep them from becoming more
seriously involved in the conflicts of other regions, in
particular, southern Africa.
Debate on Humanitarian Intervention
The war in Kosovo triggered a lively debate on the
issues of sovereignty of states and the right of the
international community to intervene in other states
internal affairs. Some held that the rising importance
of humanitarian intervention is an inevitable con-
sequence of the rising importance of human rights.
Others pointed out the problematic high degree of
selectiveness which goes hand-in-hand with the
present praxis of humanitarian intervention. The non-
intervention in Chechnya was cited as just one
example. In terms of realpolitik, a decision on a case-by-
case basis will bring with it the inherent danger of
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double standards is a troubling perspective. To pre-
vent the consolidation of such double standards, the
creation of formalised standards for intervention was
suggested. Yet, as some pointed out, such compre-
hensive and generally applicable standards would
raise several problems due to the diversity of situa-
tions calling for humanitarian intervention. All
decisions on intervention have to take into consider-
ation a number of non-formalised, political criteria
which resist being put into a list of formalised criteria.
Another argument against formalised standards for
humanitarian intervention suggested that the whole
notion of humanitarian intervention may be mis-
leading. The underlying reasons for the intervention
in Kosovo were not humanitarian, but political. This
was, at least, the view of some of the participants,
Europeans as well as non-Europeans. Several govern-
ments of NATO members feared that without inter-
vention the stability of the Balkan would deteriorate
further, there would be more refugees flooding coun-
tries such as Austria, Italy and Germany. Also, NATOs
credibility as a guarantor of European security would
be at risk.
Yet, there was agreement on one basic point, that of
whether one is in favour of humanitarian intervention
or not. Certain types of violent internal conflict have
become a threat to regional and international peace
and security and, therefore, have to be internationally
addressed. A new definition of international security
is needed which recognises internal conflict as a
possible threat to international peace and security.
The question is which international bodies should be
entrusted with the decision to intervene, with possible
actors being the UN, regional organisations and
coalitions of the willing.
The international body deciding on interventions
should fulfill two principle requirements:
! In case of a humanitarian emergency, they must be
able to reach a decision quickly and act accordingly.
! To lend legitimacy to the decision, it must reflect
the will of as great a number of countries as
possible.
All of the actors mentioned above have short-
comings in regard to these principles. The UN and its
Security Council (SC) are often very slow to act. The
Permanent Members often refuse to take action and
authorise intervention or peace operations when the
respective case is outside their sphere of interest. As
for regional organisations and coalitions of the
willing, an intervention would not be backed by a
majority of states. In both cases, the driving momen-
tum of an intervention would be in the interests of a
limited number of states which somehow have a stake
in the conflict at hand. The option of coalitions of the
willing acting without permission from the UN was
unanimously rejected by the participants, the prece-
dent set by NATO in Serbia was regretted.
The role that regional organisations can play differs
from region to region. Europe has an abundance of
regional organisations. Their division of labour is still
unclear and needs to be better defined. Contrary there-
to, Asia and its states anxiously guard their sovereign-
ty and seem unwilling to give regional organisations
the power to interfere in their internal affairs. This
contrasts with Europe, Africa and the Americas, where
most states feel comfortable with passing defined and
limited parts of their sovereignty to regional organi-
sations, allowing them to intervene under certain
circumstances.
The UN, in the final analysis, was regarded by most
of the participants as the proper and primary forum
to provide legitimacy to interventions, although at
present, the SC neither works well, nor does its
decisions represent a majority of states. Due to lack of
time, the discussion only briefly focused on how to
reform the UN, including the Security Council.
The Environmental Situation
Comparing the border-crossing environmental issues
in Europe to the South, the discussion revealed a
major difference due to the dense population and
high level of industrialisation in Europe. Yet, although
border-crossing environmental pollution is serious,
violent conflict as a consequence of these problems is
hardly imaginable. There are enough instruments
available to settle these conflicts with the established
negotiation patterns and integration. On the other
hand, several border-crossing environmental issues in
the South are limited in number but potentially
violent. Taken within the context of other socio-
economic problems, environmental problems provide
a potential for conflict, such as water conflicts in
Africa, the Middle East and on the Indian sub-
continent. There is a serious deficiency of conflict
management instruments in most regions outside
Europe for the following reasons:
! poverty impairs possibilities for generous compro-
mises with neighbouring countries, and also limits
the options to compensate for the paucity of re-
sources through highly efficient use of said ones;
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! a lack of networking which is due to the inadequacy
and ineffectiveness of international environmental
agreements and an insufficient list of priorities;
! incompetent governance which leads to shortcomings
of the following three stages: firstly, the recognition
of the necessity of fair environmental rules which
meet both sustainable quality of life requirements
as well as economic development; secondly, a legal
structure including international agreements that
embody these rules and thirdly, the ability to
effectively enforce this legal structure.
One panellist summarised the four requirements to
reconcile economy and ecology:
1. The polluter-pays-principle: This affixes production
costs directly to the producer which is necessary to
set up a real price calculation. This, in turn, would
initiate the right market signal by internalising the
scarcity not only of capital and labour but also of
environmental resources, instead of externalising
the costs to society in general; it would be indis-
criminate without such pricing. Also, a demand
would be created that does not take into account
the limiting factor of the environment.
2. All scarce goods must have a price, otherwise the
goods will be squandered. This applies particularly
to water for irrigation, and to energy for the
heating of homes.
3. If the power constellation is asymmetrical as in the
case of upstream and downstream countries, up-
stream countries have to understand that co-oper-
ative solutions are still beneficial. The one-sided
pursuit of ones own is inefficient in the long run. It
prevents participation in the benefits of open and
integrated markets.
4. If an international or global resource, such as lakes,
oceans or the atmosphere, is being used or pol-
luted, the property rights have to be clarified. If
there is no obvious criteria to attribute to property,
the equal-per-capita principle with regard to the
costs is the most convincing one. The often still
applied grandfathering principle which says that
those who polluted most in the past have also the
right to pollute most in the future, is unacceptable.
The continuing application of this principle might
create a major North-South conflict in the future,
for instance, in the context of a global climate
policy.
The discussion then concentrated on the question
as to how to improve the global application of these
principles. It became quite clear that more progress
has to be made concerning the first three principles
mainly in the South. Considering the fourth principle,
it is particularly the North that has to depart from its
preference of the grandfathering principle. There was
an obvious failure to understand this issue even
among those participating in the negotiating process.
More effort has to be made to improve the intellectual
standard of international environmental policy.
Another topic concerning the general impact of
globalisation was discussed, namely the question as to
whether globalisation, as such, favours industrial
countries, providing a distinct disadvantage to poorer
developing countries. Developed countries can adjust
much faster to emerging sectors, such as information
technology. While it appears that the gap is widening
between poor and rich countries it is obvious, on the
other hand, that globalisation is opening up vast op-
portunities to any country which exploits its com-
parative advantages in global competition. The ability
to establish competitive structures, however, is a
question of governance. It requires the convincing of
ones own society to adjust to changed rules of com-
petition, internally as well as externally. However, this
is a difficult task in many countries where ethnic,
religious or national diversity and traditions clash
with the need for modernisation.
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Evolving Global Governance Structures
Task-sharing, Division of Labour and Co-operation
between Regional and Global Security Arrangements
A Joint International Workshop by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and
the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, April 68, 2000
Thursday, 6 April
14.0014.45 Introduction: Evolving Global Governance Structures:
A Project of North-South-Networking among Scientific Institutions
Winrich Kühne, SWP, and Ernst Hillebrand, FES
Part I
The Shape of Things to come
Dominant Security and Stability Concerns in the Next Decade
Major challenges to security and stability in the next decades may come
not from interstate conflicts, but from new security issues related to
developments in the economic, social and ecological arenas. Globalisation
and the uneven distribution of its costs and benefits may result in the
fragmentation of existing societies. Identity conflicts over religion,
ethnicity and culture may become more and more widespread, resulting
in the disintegration of existing states and societies. At the same time, the
proliferation of arms of mass destruction gives interstate conflict a new
and potentially dramatic dimension. The first part of the conference will
pertain to the major security threats  old and new  in each of the world
regions.
14.4516.15 Session I:
Environmental and Resource Conflict
Environmental and resource conflicts will become more widespread in
the future. They tend to have inner-societal as well as trans-border dimen-
sions. A new area of conflict may evolve with the question of trans-border
pollution and environmental hazards. A global dimension is added when
questions of global concern (bio-diversity, global warming, ozone-layer
depletion) are taken into account. The session is aimed at describing the
major dimensions of potential resource and environmental conflicts in
the respective regions.
Latin America: Guadalupe González, Mexico
Sub-Saharan Africa: Zondi Maziza, South Africa
Asia: Sook-Jong Lee, Korea
Middle East/North Africa: Kadry Said, Egypt
Europe: Friedemann Müller, SWP
Discussion
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16.4518.30 Session II:
Conventional Military Conflict (Interstate War) And Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Given the potentially antagonistic character of interests between states
and societies, the existence of interstate war continues to pose a serious
threat to peace and stability in all parts of the world. The session will
analyse the major regional risks of interstate conflict and the potential of
further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Some questions to
be discussed:
What are the major risks of interstate conflict in the region?
What are the trends in armament and the proliferation of arms of
mass destruction?
How could the proliferation of arms of mass destruction alter the patterns
of interstate conflict in the region?
Latin America: Tullo Vigevani, Brazil
Sub-Saharan Africa: Garth Le Pere, South Africa
Asia: Bharat Karnad, India; Kim Chang-Su, Korea
Middle East/North Africa: Kadry Said, Egypt
Europe: Winrich Kühne, SWP
Discussion
Friday, 7 April
08.30 Transfer from Landhotel Huber to the SWP
09.0010.00 Session III:
Conflict over Governance, Human and Minority Rights,
Democratisation, Identity (ethnicity, religion) and Social Conflict
As globalisation unfolds, its implications threaten the social and eco-
nomic cohesion of entire states and societies. States lose parts of their
control and problem-solving capacities. Deepening fragmentation inside
existing states along socio-economic, cultural, ethnic and religious line
could be one of the consequences of this development, potentially
breaking up existing states. A new era of micro-identities with severe
consequences for existing nation-states may evolve.
What tendencies towards civil strife exist?
What are the consequences of globalisation and the
uneven social distribution of its economic costs and benefits?
Is there a trend towards fragmentation and a growing
sense of sub-national identities?
Will ethnicity and religious heterogeneity threaten the
cohesion of existing states?
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Latin America: Gilberto Dupas, Brazil
Sub-Saharan Africa: Zondi Maziza, South Africa
Asia: Zheng Rui Xiang, China; Pran Chopra, India
Middle East/North Africa: Ahmed Ibrahim Mahmoud, Egypt; Yoram Meital,
Israel
Europe: Stefan Mair, SWP
Discussion
Part II
How to Deal with Non-Conventional Conflict?
Instruments, Aims and the Task-Sharing of
Global and Regional Institutions
Given the growing interdependency of the world, conflict-resolution will
more than ever become a complex task, involving national, regional and
global arrangements. Non-conventional conflicts will be particularly
difficult to steer, as their resolution may necessitate an outside inter-
vention in internal conflicts. Difficult questions of international law and
sovereignty are involved. On the other hand, the task to keep the
potentially disruptive effects of globalisation at bay will constitute the
very essence of any future global governance system.
Some questions related to these problems: What kind of regional and
global security arrangements are feasible? How could the task-sharing
between regional and global institutions in view of a global security
architecture be arranged? What steps of institutionalising them are
imaginable?
What role can multinational institutions like the WTO, World Bank, UN-
Organisations play in the resolution of future non-conventional conflicts?
And what responsibility do they have in creating these conflicts? What
new kind of regional and global organisations/institutions would be
necessary to come to grips with the new security questions related to
resources and environment?
14.0015.00 Session IV:
Environmental and Resource Conflict
What role do arbitration and mediation play in resolving such conflicts;
what role can international regimes play? Are regional schemes of
resource- and pollution-management feasible? How should internal
conflicts concerning scarce resources be dealt with?
Latin America: Guadalupe González, Mexico
Sub-Saharan Africa: Zondi Maziza, South Africa
Asia: Cui Hong Jian, China
Middle East/North Africa: Shaul Rahabi, Israel
Europe: Friedemann Müller, SWP
Discussion
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Saturday, 8 April
09.0010.30 Session V:
Conflict over Governance, Human and Minority Rights,
Democratisation, Identity (ethnicity, religion) and Social Conflict
The possible proliferation of intrastate conflicts raises serious questions
on how the international community should deal with this kind of
conflict. There is a growing sense of consent that large-scale human rights
violations in themselves could legitimate external interventions and
interference in intrastate conflicts. Yet, there is no discernible consent
about the legal and political base of such interference. What consent there
ever was, has been put into question by the Kosovo conflict and the
Western military intervention in absence of an UN-mandate. So how could
acceptable intervention mechanisms in the face of massive internal strife
be shaped? What role could be assigned to regional organisations? How
must UN-mechanisms be reformed to reconcile the principle of national
sovereignty with the overarching goals of peace, development and respect
for the basic rights of peoples and individuals? What role could non-state
actors possibly play in such conflict resolution mechanisms?
Latin America: Tullo Vigevani, Brazil
Sub-Saharan Africa: Garth Le Pere, South Africa
Asia: Ooi Giok Ling, Singapore
Middle East/North Africa: Kadry Said, Egypt
Europe: Cord Meier-Klodt, Germany
Discussion
12.0013.00 Concluding discussion:
Evolving Global Patterns  Whither National Sovereignty?
The conflict in Kosovo has shown the limits of the existing scheme of
international intervention in internal conflicts. In the name of Human
Rights, the traditional understanding of national sovereignty has been put
into question by NATO. What kind of regional and global institutions
involving what kind of decision-taking-processes may be fit to reconcile
the principles of national self-determination, international law and the
necessities of conflict prevention and -management in an interdependent
world?
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